Global Challenges and Country-Specific Responses through Aid Financing of Global Public Goods by Cepparulo, Alessandra & Giuriato, Luisa
 1 
WORKING PAPER 
DIPARTIMENTO DI ECONOMIA PUBBLICA 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper n. 156 
 
Alessandra Cepparulo and Luisa Giuriato 
 
Global Challenges and Country-Specific Responses through Aid Financing 
of Global Public Goods  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Roma, Novembre 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
Global Challenges and Country-Specific Responses through Aid 
Financing of Global Public Goods 
 
ALESSANDRA CEPPARULO AND LUISA GIURIATO* 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we revisit the impact of global public goods (GPGs) in Official Development 
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1. Introduction 
Globalization has made inescapable the problems connected to the production of goods and the 
prevention of bads affecting vast numbers of people for long periods of time: from greenhouse 
warming to ozone depletion, from terrorism prevention to the cure of contagious diseases. These 
goods (and the prevention of bads) whose impacts are globally spread, are generally known as 
global public goods (GPGs). They pose severe challenges to the global community as their effects 
are pervasive and resist the control of individuals and governments. 
At the core of global public goods lies a complex problem of collective decision-making. Actions to 
provide global goods and to prevent global bads are often severely insufficient, because 
governments and private agents usually fail to fully consider the benefits/costs they impose on 
others and because these shared benefits/costs are often differently evaluated in different countries. 
Therefore, coordination mechanisms fail and there is “no market nor government mechanism that 
contains both political means and appropriate incentives to implement an efficient outcome” 
(Nordhaus, 2005). International institutions and treaties only partially solve the problem as they 
cannot coerce recalcitrant countries into binding agreements.  
Proper decision-making would be eased by the knowledge of the financings globally devoted to 
GPGs. However, notwithstanding its relevance, it is very difficult to directly quantify the GPGs 
financing, as no separate accounting is generally provided in private and public budgets. An 
exception is the indirect financing of GPGs that can be detected in the Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) budgets of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor countries. In 
fact, foreign aid supports core sectors of the developing countries (security, health, environment) 
and some of the financed activities (illicit drugs combat, contagious diseases prevention,..) yield 
global benefits.  
The presence of lines of GPG financing inside aid funding have met both approval and criticism. 
On one hand, there is evidence of important complementarity relationships between aid to 
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development and GPGs provision (Zedillo and Thiam, 2006): limited development can hinder the 
provision of many GPGs that require sufficient capacity at national level. At the same time, some 
GPGs are critical for attracting private direct investment flows and for ensuring the effectiveness 
with which governments deliver national public goods
1
. On the other hand, some GPGs have 
dubious impact on development and, in some cases, they distort the whole structure of aid and 
reduce the resources available, as is the case for certain global security expenditures: “while 
domestic security in developing countries is a pre-requisite for development efforts, the current 
emphasis on global security could highjack aid as the Cold War did for decades” (Sagasti, 2005, p. 
11). 
Thus, criticisms (Anand, 2004) to aid financing of GPGs have been advanced on grounds of (i) 
ethics, as GPGs divert resources that should mainly be directed to poverty reduction; (ii) efficiency, 
as institutions for development may not be the most appropriate ones for GPG delivery; (iii) 
accountability, as GPG seem to be funded without prior assessment of needs. Particular attention 
has been attracted by the possibility that GPGs displace or crowd out traditional aid devoted to 
human development and poverty relief. A number of studies have searched for the presence and the 
size of the crowding-out effect and evidence has been found by te Velde et al. (2002) and Reisen et 
al. (2004) for the 1980s and 1990s. We complement these previous studies, by expanding the period 
of analysis to the years 1973-2009 and by comparing the effect of  adopting different sets of GPGs 
on the crowding-out effect. 
A related issue concerns the donor countries’ preference for funding certain GPGs more than others. 
This preference is influenced not only by perspective benefits, but also by the GPGs’ production (or 
aggregation) technology, which determines how the contributions of the different producers are 
combined. Linear and non-linear aggregation technologies influence the conditions for efficient 
provision by determining the number of contributors and their share in GPGs financing or 
production. For example, rich donors would seem not eager to finance those GPGs where they are 
                                                 
1
  In this sense, the UNDP Office of Development Studies has stressed the importance of IPGs for achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), notably the objectives of reducing poverty (Kaul et al.,1999, UNIDO, 2008) 
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not the dominant (or the only) provider. They would rather finance those GPGs whose production 
requires stringent minimum standards for all countries and whose underprovision could pose a 
serious threat to their own country’s security or well-being. Therefore, we expect that more 
financing is devoted to combating illegal drugs or the spread of infectious diseases like SARS than 
to the technological development of alternative fuels to slow climate change or the development of 
effective treatment against African AIDS or malaria. We search for evidence of patterns of GPGs 
financing and of trends towards GPGs whose production technology is less demanding and where 
the benefits of actions are perceived as highly significant.  
In summary, this paper examines five facets of the issues related to global public goods. First we 
discuss the nature of global public goods (Section 2). We, then, examine the flows to GPGs that are 
accounted in the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and we construct three different 
aggregates of GPGs
2
, according to the spatial dimension of the financed activities (Section 3). We 
then employ the GPG aggregates to provide some descriptive statistics and to test whether GPG 
financing crowds-out other more traditional aid spending (Section 4). We discuss the changes in 
GPGs composition over time, taking into account their different provision technologies. In 
particular, we inquire whether GPGs with weakest-link technologies have become increasingly 
important at the global level, as suggested by Sandler (1998). Finally (Section 5), we estimate the 
donors’ commitments to aid funded GPGs and we evaluate the relevance of different set of 
explanatory variables in a panel analysis.  Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Defining global public goods 
By their own nature, GPGs provide benefits which are non-rivalrous and non-excludable in 
consumption for people in more than one country and across generations
3
. Non-rivalry implies that 
                                                 
2
 We limit our attention to foreign aid allocations to global public goods, i.e. goods that generate multi-country benefits, 
thus excluding regional public goods, which  have spillover effects into neighboring countries (cross-border roads, 
dams, gas pipelines, river development). 
3
 Some of the first contributions to the GPG literature are Sandler (1992), Barrett (1993), Cornes and Sandler (1996). 
Kaul et al. (1999) provide a discussion of the definitions of GPGs and a survey of the main issues. Kaul et al. (2003) 
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the consumption of the GPG by one person does not reduce the quantity available for consumption 
by others, as in the case of the establishment and maintenance of tsunami warning systems. Non-
excludability  means that no person can be excluded from the benefits provided by the GPG (or that 
he can be excluded at a very high cost), as in the case of measures to reduce global warming.  GPGs 
which are both non rival and non excludable are called ‘pure’, the others give rise to a rich 
taxonomy (Kaul et al., 1999)
4
. 
A third and often neglected dimension of GPGs is their aggregation technology (Hirshleifer 1983; 
Cornes and Sandler 1996; Kanbur, Sandler and Morrison 1999; Kanbur 2001; Sandler 1998), by 
which the single countries’ contributions determine the overall level of provision.  
A summation/weighted sum
5
 technology implies that the contribution of each country determines, 
by simple/weighted addition, the aggregate level of provision, as in curbing air pollution or in 
reducing global warming. In this case, efficiency requires that every country contributes up to the 
point where private marginal cost equals social marginal benefit. 
For best shot technology GPGs, the level of supply is determined solely by the largest single 
contribution: for example, when researching a cure for an infectious disease, the country providing 
the largest effort is most likely to succeed. Efficiency would require that only the most efficient 
country (usually the rich countries or the U.S.) produces the good, to the point where its private 
marginal cost equals the social marginal benefit, while the other higher-cost producers should be 
inactive. However, when rich countries have no interest in a best-shot GPG (a cure for malaria or a 
disease that affects only poor countries), their incentives to contribute are poor. 
For weakest link technology GPGs (e.g., pure public goods such as fighting international terrorism; 
club goods such as air traffic control), supply depends on the weakest link of the chain (the weakest 
                                                                                                                                                                  
contributed to the literature by discussing issues related to organization and governance. Kaul et al. (2006) discuss the 
problems of GPG financing.  
4
 Impure IPGs (goods that are only partially non-rivalrous and non-excludable), club goods (non-rivalrous but 
excludable goods), global commons (rivalrous but non-excludable goods), joint products (some of them public or with 
different degrees of publicness) simultaneously yielded by one same activity. 
5
 Weighted sum technologies are common for regional public goods, For example, the cleanup of sulfur emissions from 
power plants adheres to weighted sum, as location of pollution source makes a difference on the pattern of downwind 
deposits (Binger, 2003, p.12). 
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intelligence service, the weakest health system) and the smallest contribution determines the overall 
level of provision
6
. In this case, efficiency requires that all countries contribute equally, i.e. that all 
implement a minimum standard intelligence service or health system, so that that all countries are 
vigilant in tracking and treating criminal threats or contagious diseases. 
As GPGs benefit a broad spectrum of countries and of the global population, they raise issues of 
collective action both in provision and in financing that prevent the application of market-based 
solutions. Differently from national public goods, the issues of governance and collective action 
cannot be solved by coercion from a global government. Whenever possible, international 
organizations and treaties frame these collective responses. However, the success of the collective 
action depends on how the single national contributions combine in the GPG production.  
The production of summation GPGs, in fact, is subject to the well-known problems of free riding. 
Governance problems, in this case, can be partially solved by international treaties that set the 
countries’ shares of financing or create the tradable property rights needed for providing the goods 
and that impose taxes and penalties to limit the free-riding problem. However, there is no 
international system which can coerce reluctant countries into cooperative behavior.  
Best shot GPGs need coordination, to avoid duplication of efforts, and incentives to the dominant, 
and hopefully benevolent, provider and its private sector: public-private partnerships and 
regulations are then required to avoid underprovision. The problem is acute when the benefits of 
production are widely dispersed or perceived as insignificant by the dominant provider: for 
example, when searching for a cure for malaria or for a disease that affects only poor countries. 
Finally, there are strong incentives for countries to cooperate and provide for weakest-link GPGs 
whose benefits are tangible: for example  protection against terrorist attacks or contagious diseases. 
However, weakest link GPGs require identifying the country or the group of countries that provide 
                                                 
6
 Income distribution among contributors is a further element that influences the supply of IPGs. In case of IPGs of a 
summation kind, the neutrality theorem applies (Warr, 1993; Cornes and Sandler, 1996) and the level of public good 
provision is indifferent to any change in income distribution among contributors. On the contrary, distribution matters 
and redistribution can be Pareto improving, when the provision technology is not of a summation kind (Jayaraman and 
Kanbur, 1999; Lei et al. 2007). 
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the smallest contribution and establishing whether they can afford to pay for it. Partnerships among 
the various contributors can solve this collective action problem.  
 
3. Global public goods in the Official Development Assistance budgets 
As mentioned before, attempts to estimate the countries’ contribution to GPGs financing find a 
nearly insurmountable obstacle in the absence of specific line items in the national public and 
private budgets.  Estimates are less arduous, when GPGs are financed through rich countries’ aid 
budgets, in the form of either in-kind transfers (dispatching of peacekeeping forces or of medical 
teams) or of income transfers (Vicary and Sandler, 2002; Lei et al., 2007). Estimates of the shares 
of GPGs on aid vary a lot, ranging from 3.7 per cent (Anand, 2002) to 12.5 per cent (World Bank, 
2001), to 16 per cent (Reisen et al., 2004) and to 25 per cent (Raffer, 1998). These differences are 
almost entirely attributable to differences in the definition of what ”global” means.  
The estimates of aid financing of GPGs provided in this paper are based on the Aid Activity 
database of the OECD-DAC, the CRS, which offers a sector allocation of aid based on common 
definitions agreed by all DAC donors. As in Reisen et al. (2004), to distinguish GPGs from regional 
public goods, we employ the OECD criteria, based on the donors’ reports of the sectoral allocation 
of their annual commitments as regional or global public goods
7
: the choice suffers from an 
inescapable degree of arbitrariness and from “a certain willingness to overstate rather than 
understate support for regional (and global) programs” (Birdsall, 2005, p 392). Our aggregates 
cover just a fraction of the worldwide provision of GPGs, not only because ODA is a tiny share of 
world total resource flows, but also because the OECD-CRS does not include important donor 
countries, such as China or Russia, nor, until recently, the significant flows from private charities, 
                                                 
7
 This implies excluding some activities that are “core” according to the World Bank, but which have a limited spatial 
dimension, for example, “post-conflict peace building of the United Nations peace operations” or “land mine 
clearance”, which have national/regional spatial dimension. On the contrary, we include the expenditures for “narcotics 
control activities” that are functional to the provision of the global good ‘Crime control’, whose benefits have a global 
scale. 
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such as the Gates Foundation. However, we believe that our analysis can offer useful insights in 
GPGs provision and financing. 
The 59 (out of 194) CRS selected sectors are aggregated into seven broad categories: (i) Knowledge 
generation and dissemination, (ii) Human rights, (iii) Communicable disease control, (iv) Global 
governance, (v) Crime control and global peace, (vi) Global commons and sustainability, (vii) 
Communications.  
These categories are, then, employed to construct three aggregates of GPGs (Table 1). The first one 
(gpgr) is built according to Reisen et al. (2004) – OECD definition. The second aggregate (gpgm) 
includes those GPGs that are relevant for the Millennium Development Goals, as specified by the 
UK Department for International Development (Speight, 2002). The third aggregate (gpge), which 
will be the benchmark in our analysis, is the largest sectoral set: it expands the gpgm set adding the 
expenditures for Communications and those for Crime control. Both the gpgm and the gpge 
aggregates exclude activities related to the protection of Human rights, which is a permanent 
concern at international level, but whose benefits we deem to be basically national
8
. The three 
aggregates are expressed in 2008 constant USD and they include both loans and grants, as, in 
general, the GPGs financing is not peculiarly skewed towards grant-financing as compared to ODA 
(Anand, 2004, p. 231)
9
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 The categories of GPGs we employ in the gpgm and gpge aggregates do not match perfectly those chosen by Reisen et 
al. (2004) as we have added or removed some sectors. Details are provided in Cepparulo and Giuriato (2009). 
9
 On the contrary, Mascarenhas and Sandler (2004) argue that grants are the most appropriate form of aid for financing 
spillovers associated with IPGs. They test the hypothesis that the share of grants in aid reflects the importance of 
spillover effects and find that the mean grant share is highest for knowledge IPGs (95 per cent for bilateral donors) and 
health IPGs (90 per cent) and lowest for global governance (81 per cent) and environment expenditures (83 per cent). 
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Table 1 – Definitions of Global Public Goods (GPGs) 
 
Categories  GPGs according to 
Reisen et al. 
(2004)  
gpgr 
GPGs for the 
Millennium Goals 
 
gpgm 
 
Extended 
aggregate of GPGs 
 
Gpge 
 
Knowledge generation and dissemination √ √ √ 
Human rights √   
Communicable disease control √ √ √ 
Global governance √ √ √ 
Crime control and peace building √  √ 
Global commons and sustainability √ √ √ 
Communications   √ 
  
 
4. Long-run trends in aid financing of global public goods: 1973-2009 
While the 1970s and 1980s were characterized by stagnation in aid giving and the early 1990s by 
aid contraction, due to the re-thinking of development policies after the end of the Cold War, the 
subsequent years saw an encouraging rise in ODA, thanks to the impulse of the global debate on 
poverty reduction at the beginning of the new millennium (Millennium Summit, 2000) and to the 
pledges of aid scale-up, renewed at the Monterrey (2002) and Gleneagles (2005) summits. The 
largest part of aid is provided by bilateral financing (73 per cent on average), which is also the 
largest source of GPGs financing. Depending on the set adopted (Graph 1), GPGs cover 15-18 per 
cent of bilateral ODA at the end of the 2000s.The largest increase in the share of GPGs on aid can 
be observed for the benchmark aggregate, gpge: from 2.7 per cent on average in the 1970s to 13.9 
per cent on average in the 2000s. 
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Graph 1 – Bilateral ODA and ODA financing of global public goods: 1973-2009 (USD million  and 
%) 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on OECD-CRS. Notes: the right-hand scale is referred to total ODA to GDP. The 
left-hand scale is referred to the shares of GPGs to ODA for the three aggregates. 
 
 
Aid financing of GPG is very unevenly distributed among DAC countries: for brevity’s sake and 
because there is no substantial loss of information, we present (Table 2) only the data for the 
benchmark set (gpge)
10
. In the 1970s the largest contributions to total GPGs came from Japan 
(32%), Germany (16%), Canada (12%) and France (11%). During the following four decades, all 
these countries reduced their shares in the aggregate financing, while the UK and the US became 
the largest contributors (9,6% and 44,2% respectively in the 2000s). Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
the Netherlands and Sweden have more or less kept unchanged their shares in total financing (3-4 
                                                 
10
 Data for the other aggregates are available from the authors on request. 
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%). Some countries have, instead, decreased their participation to tiny values: Italy’s contribution 
has fallen from 5 to 0.6 per cent of total financing to GPGs. 
 
Table 2 – DAC countries’ average share on total financing of Global Public Goods (gpge)  out of 
bilateral ODA (%) 
Country 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Australia 0.69 0.20 3.57 2.86 
Austria 0.14 0.11 0.23 0.34 
Belgium n.a. 0.07 0.87 1.22 
Canada 12.26 6.32 4.78 3.12 
Denmark 1.58 2.87 2.41 1.56 
Finland n.a. 0.96 1.20 0.84 
France 11.39 13.70 7.65 4.78 
Germany 16.21 6.32 5.14 6.37 
Greece n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.41 
Ireland n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.53 
Italy n.a. 5.35 2.93 0.64 
Japan 31.97 25.12 18.72 6.21 
Luxembourg n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.12 
Netherlands 3.00 3.31 5.88 4.31 
New Zealand n.a. 0.18 0.02 0.15 
Norway 3.84 2.87 3.44 3.47 
Portugal n.a. n.a. 0.15 0.50 
Spain n.a. 0.20 2.50 2.51 
Sweden 3.68 8.03 4.40 2.81 
Switzerland 0.62 2.45 1.68 3.46 
United Kingdom 5.78 1.70 6.72 9.57 
United States 8.85 20.23 27.71 44.21 
 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: own elaborations based on OECD-CRS data. 
 
 
Donors can be divided into geographical and linguistic groups and we find that they display a 
certain degree of homogeneity in GPG financing (Table 3). Anglo-Saxon countries have lower than 
average contributions to aid, but in the 1990s and 2000s they exhibit the largest increase in the 
share of GPGs on bilateral ODA. The same above average share of GPGs to ODA in the 2000s is 
observed for Southern European countries, which have the lowest values for all variables in the 
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period. Northern European countries are more generous, having approximately more than twice the 
average share of GDP allocated to both ODA and GPGs: they also have a higher than average share 
of aid devoted to GPGs and the lowest dispersion in their pattern of financing. Central European 
countries and Japan are also generous in aid giving, but they contribute less to GPGs.  
 
4.1 The composition of global public goods 
The composition of the aid financing to GPGs has dramatically changed in the period, as shown in 
Table 4. The larger change is observed for GPGs provided by weakest-link technologies, in 
particular, Crime control and Communicable disease control. Disease control (e.g. infectious 
disease control and sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS control), which covered only 5 per 
cent of total expenditures in the 1970s, reaches 27.7 per cent in the 2000s, while Crime control (e.g. 
Narcotics control) jumps from 0.2 to 19.1 per cent. GPGs provided by summation or best-shot 
technologies (mostly included in the categories Communication, Knowledge generation and 
dissemination, Global commons and Global governance) display lower and sometimes negative 
trends. Communications (e.g. communication policies, telecommunication, free flow of 
information), which was the largest category in the 1970s and 1980s, shrinks to 2.5 per cent of total 
GPGs in the 2000s. Global commons, which include GPGs with dominance of summation 
technologies (e.g. biosphere protection, biodiversity protection, renewable resources) and which 
constantly increased until the 1990s, have substantially decreased (from 35.2 to 19.4 per cent) as a 
share on total GPGs in the last decade.  
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Table 3 -  ODA spending on Global Public Goods by groups of DAC donors (gpge, %): 1973-2009 (Average, Av., and Relative Standard Deviation, RSD) 
  1970s    1980s    1990s    2000s   
Countries  ODA/GDP gpge/GDP  gpge/ODA   ODA/GDP gpge/GDP  gpge/ODA   ODA/GDP gpge/GDP  gpge/ODA   ODA/GDP gpge/GDP  gpge/ODA  
                 
All Av. 0.45 0.01 2.69  0.45 0.03 5.19  0.38 0.03 7.93  0.43 0.06 13.96 
 RSD 60.02 112.95 97.58  56.16 126.61 93.92  68.29 95.67 79.19  71.13 91.81 63.40 
                 
Anglo- 
saxon 
Av. 0.36 0.01 1.88  0.23 0.01 3.55  0.20 0.02 10.38  0.26 0.04 17.02 
RSD 32.41 134.55 115.50  44.66 114.77 102.05  39.29 96.28 88.48  37.36 52.44 41.32 
                 
North  
Europe 
Av. 0.56 0.03 4.04  0.68 0.06 8.62  0.73 0.07 10.71  0.81 0.12 15.17 
RSD 49.51 84.70 83.54  27.73 86.02 80.01  34.17 46.44 48.49  38.50 53.98 25.64 
                 
Central 
Europe  
Av. 0.53 0.01 1.77  0.53 0.02 3.97  0.45 0.03 5.46  0.52 0.05 10.86 
RSD 57.82 85.20 80.37  45.16 66.18 78.68  40.07 82.36 68.96  51.14 80.97 78.20 
                 
South  
Europe 
Av. 0.04    0.28 0.01 3.52  0.13 0.01 5.74  0.15 0.02 15.72  
RSD 58.29    50.08 75.20 45.27  56.87 81.42 78.52  60.23 74.87 83.68 
                 
Japan Av. 0.38 0.02 6.22  0.45 0.03 6.91  0.50 0.03 6.27  0.46 0.03 6.00 
 RSD 20.88 23.47 26.77  16.67 49.03 35.13  7.19 24.62 21.38  14.57 36.35 29.22 
 
Source: own elaborations based on OECD-CRS data  
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Table  4 -  The composition of ODA spending on Global Public Goods  by groups of DAC donors 
and categories (gpge, %): 1973-2009 
 
Knowledge generation and 
dissemination 
 
Communicable disease 
eradication 
 Global governance 
 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s  1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s  1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Countries               
All 9.8 12.9 9.7 8.2  5.1 5.1 8.3 27.7  16.6 17.9 23.6 23.1 
Anglo-
saxon 
16.2 24.6 11.4 3.7  12.2 6.0 15.2 37.5  14.7 37.9 21.7 26.1 
North 
Europe 
6.5 9.8 11.0 19.2  9.6 14.0 9.1 14.3  14.6 9.1 12.6 16.9 
Central 
Europe 
5.1 7.4 18.8 18.2  1.8 2.7 7.5 15.7  34.7 10.2 11.3 20.7 
South 
Europe 
 5.6 9.3 7.6   3.8 4.0 7.5   0.5 4.2 13.7 
 
Japan 
9.9 9.2 2.6 3.3  1.0 1.8 1.3 4.5  0.8 12.6 9.7 17.1 
 
Crime control and peace 
building 
 
Global commons and 
sustainability 
 Communications 
 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s  1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s  1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Countries               
All  0.2 4.1 19.1  17.9 24.9 35.3 19.4  50.6 39.0 19.1 2.5 
Anglo-
saxon  
 12.1 23.9  15.9 19.1 32.3 7.1  41.0 12.3 7.4 1.8 
North 
Europe  
1.1 3.5 14.2  55.8 43.1 46.6 32.4  13.4 22.9 17.2 3.0 
Central 
Europe  
 1.6 10.8  10.6 16.9 35.4 31.7  47.7 62.9 25.4 2.9 
South 
Europe  
 7.4 27.7   38.4 34.1 41.0   51.7 41.0 2.5 
 
Japan  
  1.6  16.0 24.7 50.5 66.0  72.3 51.7 35.9 7.5 
 
Source: own elaborations based on OECD-CRS data.  
Notes: The GPG aggregate of reference is the extended one (gpge). Data for lines sum up to 100,0 for the different sub-
periods. In bold the highest average share in donors’ GPG-related ODA for each decade. 
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These trends convey the idea that GPGs with weakest-link technologies have become increasingly 
important at the global level: they are connected to global health emergencies (the SARS or the 
Avian Flu), terrorism (after September 11, 2001) and narco traffic control. At the same time, the 
contributions from poorer countries, which are usually also the weakest-links in provision, have 
probably fallen behind the level desired by DAC donors. To avoid suboptimal provision, donor 
countries have increased their participation in the financing of those weakest-link GPGs which 
represent a priority for them, also by targeting aid flows to their provision in the developing 
countries. This observation supports Sandler’s (1998) anticipation of the increase in the sub-
optimality of provision levels of weakest-link GPGs, “unless the richest countries either subsidize 
the poorest countries’ provision or else step in and provide the public goods for these poor 
countries” (Sandler, 1998, p. 235).  
Table 4 shows the composition of the GPG-related ODA for the same groups of countries employed 
in Table 3. Anglo-Saxon countries have experienced the most decisive shift from summation to 
weakest link GPGs: activities related to Crime control and Communicable disease control, which 
amounted to tiny of total gpge in the 1980s, have reached respectively 23.9 and 37.5 per cent in the 
last decade. At the same time, expenditures for Global commons, Communication and Knowledge 
have substantially decreased in the last decades.  
North European countries have increased their financing to Crime control in the period (from 1,1 to 
14,2 per cent of their total gpge financing), but in the 2000s they still keep most of their GPG 
budget on summation goods, such as Global commons (32,4 per cent) and Global governance (16,9 
per cent). Communicable disease control present, instead, a lower share of financing (14,3 per cent). 
Central European countries tend to conform to the pattern of expenditures of the North European 
countries: however, they have first increased their financing to Global commons and then kept it 
stable, while increasing their spending on Knowledge and Global stability, at the expenses of 
Communications activities. Southern European countries and Japan concentrate their GPG budget 
on Global commons. They have drastically decreased their expenditures on Communications, while 
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increasing those on Global Governance and weakest-link GPGs, such as Crime control (27,7 per 
cent for the South European countries) and Communicable disease eradication.  
A first impression from Tables 3 and 4 is that no clear pattern is respected in the financing of GPGs. 
This complements Mascharenas and Sandler’s (2005) finding that neither aid allocation follows 
clear financing patterns. A host of considerations involving perspective benefits and genuine 
altruism probably drives the donors’ decision on how much aid to allocate to GPGs: donor-specific 
gains from other aid spending (geo-political considerations, trade and political ties), satisfaction 
from altruistic giving to alleviate poverty or to contribute to the solution of world-wide problems 
and non-rival/non-excludable benefits from GPGs. For example, Nordic countries, which seem to 
be less driven by the search for donor-specific gains from aid (Gates and Hoeffler, 2004), have kept 
a generous level of financing to poor countries over time, while not renouncing to redirect part of it 
to global issues: are they just becoming less generous or are they leaving behind the ‘old school’ 
development assistance patterns (Severino and Ray, 2009) in search for greater coherence between 
aid and other dimensions of their international economic policies? The same caution must be 
applied to the Anglo-Saxon countries. Their shift towards weakest-link GPG financing could be the 
attempt to buy an insurance against risky and disruptive events, even in the absence of cooperation 
from other countries. Alternatively, it could be the consequence of the strict pursuit of their 
geopolitical and security interest, whose complementary with poor countries development is 
doubtful (Sagasti, 2005). Section 5 of this paper will provide some tentative answers. 
 
4.2  Does GPG-related ODA crowd-out other forms of aid expenditure?  
Concerns for coherence in aid programs and the fear that GPGs crowd-out aid devoted to poverty 
reduction have been growing since the 1990s. Displacement seems all the more harmful when there 
exist complementarities between global and national public goods, as it could weaken developing 
countries’ ability to provide GPGs themselves (te Velde et al. 2002, p. 142). A number of studies 
have searched for the presence and the size of the crowding-out effect and evidence has been found 
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both in a strong (te Velde et al., 2002) and in a soft version (Reisen et al., 2004) for the 1980s and 
1990s. 
As Reisen et al. (2004) claim, “there is no straightforward way to test for crowding-out” (p. 28).  
Borrowing from te Velde et al. (2002) , we regress (equation 1) the share of GPG on ODA 
(gpgji/oda, j represents each of the three definitions  adopted),  ODA (oda) and a dummy  countryn,, 
with n indicating the groups of countries already presented in Table 3
11
. The regression analysis is 
performed for decades and for all definitions. A positive value of the coefficient β implies that an 
increase in ODA is associated with an increasing GPGs to ODA ratio.  
 
(1)     gpg
j
it/oda = β odait +countryn + εt 
 
Table 5 presents the results. For all groups of countries, the coefficient for oda is significant and it 
increases in time. Confirming the results of Reisen et al. (2004), a soft substitution effect can be 
detected only for the gpge and gpgr aggregates. This latter aggregate is also the best performing. 
The substitution effect is absent for the gpgm definition, probably because it includes expenditure 
items, which are more complementary to traditional aid. However, we deem that a larger aggregate, 
as gpge, is in general preferable, as its broader coverage catches deeper information of donors’ 
choices in time. 
The results of Table 5 confirm the significance of the coefficient for the country dummies and the 
homogeneity of GPG financing for groups of countries. North European countries have the largest 
values for the dummy, which smoothly increase in time. On a lesser scale, the same holds true also 
for Anglo-Saxon donor countries, while the effect is less marked for Central European countries 
These results complement the descriptive statistics of Table 3, suggesting that for some countries 
GPGs have become an increasingly important chapter of the ODA budget, to a certain extent also at 
the expenses of traditional aid.  
                                                 
11
 Differently from te Velde et al. (2002, we do not include temporal dummies, but we prefer dummies for 
homogeneous groups of donors. 
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5. What determines aid financing of global public goods? 
We finally examine the factors that determine the donors’ decision on GPG-related ODA. We adapt 
the hybrid models on aid allocation (for a survey, see McGillivray and White, 1993), focusing on 
the donors side, separating the two stages, how much to give and how to allocate, and concentrating 
on the first one. The determinants of the financing flows are searched among the more or less 
explicit interests of donors, their preferences and constraints. Recipient countries are considered as 
an unicum, which is consistent with our interest in global goods financing, where benefits of GPGs 
are potentially equal for all countries and the relevant role is that of the financer/producer.  
The variables considered are selected following Reisen et al. (2004) but their number has been 
enlarged and they have been grouped into four headings: i) indicators of openness to the rest of the 
world (OUTW); ii) indicators of preferences for domestic public expenditure (DPE); iii) an 
indicator of potential direct benefits from GPG provision, the donors’ population (Pop), as in 
Barrett (2007); iv) indicators of financial constraints (FC). Table 6 shows that the statistical 
significance of the variables, averaged over the period 1997-2001 for each of the 22 donor countries 
and examined with respect to averaged GPGs share on GDP, for the three definitions.   
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Table 5 – ODA spending on Global Public Goods and the crowding-out of other forms of aid expenditure by groups of DAC countries: 1973-2009 
 gpge/oda gpgr/oda gpgm/oda 
 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1973-2009 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1973-2009 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1973-2009 
                
oda 3.4E-07 7.6E-07 9.8E-07 3.7E-06* 3.2E-06* 1.6E-07 1.7E-06* 2.4E-06** 5.0E-06* 4.4E-06* -7.2E-07 -9.6E-06 -4.5E-06* -5.4E-06* -3.5E-06** 
countryi,                
Japan 0.06* 0.06* 0.05* 0.006 0.03* 0.05* 0.07* 0.04** 0.006 0.02* 0.02* 0.1** 0.1* 0.13* 0.07* 
Central 
Europe 
0.01* 0.03* 0.04* 0.09* 0.04* 0.01* 0.02* 0.04* 0.07* 0.03* 0.01** 0.06* 0.1* 0.14* 0.08* 
South 
Europe 
-1.0E-04 0.03* 0.04* 0.14* 0.08* -6.6E-05 0.04* 0.03* 0.06* 0.04* 0.0003 0.06* 0.05* 0.15* 0.09* 
Anglo-
Saxon   
0.01* 0.03* 0.08* 0.15* 0.07* 0.02* 0.03* 0.07* 0.13* 0.06* 0.01* 0.15 0.08* 0.24* 0.12* 
North 
Europe 
0.03* 0.08* 0.1* 0.14* 0.09* 0.04* 0.09* 0.12* 0.14* 0.1* 0.05* 0.08* 0.19* 0.22* 0.14* 
No. 119 164 203 218 704 119 179 208 218 724 119 170 209 220 718 
R2 
0.525 0.562 0.600 0.752 0.518 0.412 0.499 0.603 0.891 0.592 0.273 0.064 0.209 0.397 0.161 
                 
Source: own elaborations based on OECD-CRS data.  
Note: LS dummy variable estimation with robust standard errors.   * p<0.05, ** p<0.1 
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Table 6 –Correlation coefficients for the ratio of Global Public Goods to GDP: 1973-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on OECD-CRS data. 
Notes. All variables but population are expressed as a percentage of GDP.  * p<0.05, ** p<0.1 
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 The statistical significance of the variables included under the heading Openness to the rest of the 
world  (OUTW) conveys the idea that donors more present on international markets are more 
globalized and thus more interested in GPGs. This result is all the more interesting if considered in 
comparison of the poor level of correlation between ODA financing and FDI  expenditure showed 
by Alesina and Dollars (2000).  Preference for domestic public expenditure  (DPE), as expressed by 
the general government final consumption expenditure and by the sum of main lines of 
expenditures (health, military, R&D, education), is significantly and positively correlated with the 
three aggregates of GPGs. The single items of public expenditure present, instead, different 
correlations with GPGs, both positive and negative, and changing along the decades. We interpret 
this result in the sense that, in time, some types of expenditure have become more globalized than 
others and are now  more influenced by global factors, all the more if the donor country is outward 
oriented. Therefore, depending on donors’ perception of global emergencies in the sanitary or 
security field, expenditures on health and crime control GPGs can be seen as alternative to 
expenditures on corresponding domestic goods: this explains the negative sign of the correlations in 
the 2000s, for the three GPG definitions. Domestic public expenditures on education are not a 
globalized item of expenditure and cannot be considered as alternative to knowledge GPGs. Instead, 
a preference for domestic education can be a motive for financing the same good at the global level: 
in fact, the correlation between education expenditure and GPGs (all definitions) is positive. These 
results are different from those found by Reisen et al. (2004, p. 25), where these same variables are 
significantly correlated only with the ratio of ODA to GDP.  
The donors’ population (Pop) catches the potential benefits from GPG financing. It is weakly 
correlated in the first three decades, but it becomes significant for all GPGs definitions in the 2000s. 
The negative sign could be explained by a number of factors: big donors’ misperception of the 
benefits linked to GPGs; the fact the small countries are also more open and globalized; or the fact 
that a larger population puts stronger pressure on the solution of domestic problems.  
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Among the variables related to the state of the public finances (FC), the most significant are the 
interest expenditure and the budget balance, which show the expected signs. In the 2000s, when 
public finance constraints became tighter in the EU countries participating in the EMU and in 
Japan, all public finance variables are significant and with the right sign: the relationship is positive 
for the budget balance, as in Reisen et al. (2004), and negative for the general government gross 
financial liabilities and interest expenditure. This suggests that part of the generosity in GPG 
financing is explained by the availability of public saving: countries undergoing a period of public 
finance distress or reform tend to cut all more flexible budget items, including the support to 
international programs.  
Using the three definitions of GPGs  and one variable for each group of determinants reported in 
Table 6, we estimate an individual fixed-effect model
12
 with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) robust 
standard error
13
 for the unbalanced dataset of 22 countries
14
, observed for 37 years (1973-2009). In 
the estimated equation (2), 
 
(2)       Gpg
j
 it/gdp = β1 FCit + β1 Popit  + β1 DPEit  + β1 OUTWit  +  εit 
 
the upscript j refers to the definition of GPGs, the subscript i denotes the donor and the subscript t 
denotes the year. The disturbance term is given by two error components, εit = αi  + uit with αi 
representing the country effect, which we assume a fixed effect, including cultural and historic 
aspects, by assumption  correlated with the regressors. The term uit is the stochastic error.   
We first estimate a general model in which we consider all single items of domestic public 
expenditure (DPE) and one variable for each other heading. The results (Table 7- model A) show 
that, for all definitions of GPGs, the effect of the donor’s size (pop) is significant but tiny and that 
                                                 
12
 We need to take under control unmeasured characteristics of the states which can  influence the GPG financing  
decision. 
13
 Standard errors are robust to general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence provided that T is larger than 
N, as in our case. 
14
 Ireland, Luxembourg, Greece and New Zealand are omitted because of missing values. 
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only the net interest expenditure (net_interest), as a proxy of the  financial constraints, is a 
significant determinant, with the expected sign. The balance of payments (bp_balance), as a proxy 
of openness to the rest of the world, is significant only for the gpgm aggregate. Out of single items 
of domestic expenditure, defense (milit) is almost always significant with a negative sign, which, as 
already said, can be explained by the globalized character of this type of expenditure, at least in 
recent years. When significant, the same interpretation can be applied to health and R&D. Domestic 
expenditure on education (edu) is always significant and with a positive for the gpgm aggregate, i.e. 
which includes GPGs that are relevant for the Millennium Development Goals.   
We repeat the analysis by substituting the single items of domestic expenditure with a variable 
representative of the preference for aggregate domestic expenditure public. The two natural 
candidates are: the general government final consumption expenditure (consump) and the sum of 
the single items of expenditures previously considered (hemg). Final consumption (Table 7 – model 
B) is significant and positive for all definitions and in combination with whatever other 
determinant. In model B both financial balance and net interest expenditure are significant and we 
observe an improvement in the relevance of both variables expressing openness to the rest of the 
world (foreign direct investment, fdi, and the balance of payments, bp_balance). Not reported 
results for hemg show no improvement in the regression with respect to model B. 
   
6.  Concluding remarks 
The descriptive analysis of the paper shows for all three definitions of GPGs adopted, that an 
increasing share of bilateral aid is devoted to GPGs in the period 1973-2009 and that some groups 
of countries (the Anglo-Saxon and the Northern European countries) tend to display a certain 
degree of homogeneity in their patterns of GPGs financing.  
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Table 7 – Determinants of GPG financing: panel data results (1973-2009) 
     Model A     
 Gpge/gdp Gpgr/gdp Gpgm/gdp 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
milit -0.0003* -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0004* -0.0005* -0.0004* -0.001* -0.0008* -0.0009* 
health 6.28E-05 5.90E-05 -0.0002* 0.0001* 9.40E-05* -9.93E-05* -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0006* 
r&d -0.00101 -0.00102 -0.002* -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0008* -0.003** -0.003** -0.003* 
edu -0.0002 -0.0001** 4.11E-05 -0.0001 -0.0001* 3.34E-07 0.000457* 0.000641* 0.0007* 
pop 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 1.09E-10* 1.05E-10* 1.00E-10* 
bp_balance 9.38E-06 1.00E-05  1.96E-06 3.32E-06  1.92E-05 3.13E-05**  
fin_balance -6.79E-09   1.16E-05   -3.59E-05   
fdi   4.33E-06   4.73E-07   -6.55E-06 
fin_liabilities  -7.82E-07   -1.21E-06   -1.61E-05**  
net_interest   -0.0002*   -0.0002*   -0.0002* 
Constant 0.0004 0.0005 0.001 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0008** -0.002* -0.002* -0.002** 
Obs. 133 133 132 133 133 132 133 133 132 
[continue] 
Source: author’s calculations based on OECD-CRS data. 
Notes: Fixed effects estimation with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) robust standard error. * p<0.05, ** p<0.1 
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[continue] 
 Model B  
 Gpge/gdp Gpgm/gdp Gpgo/gdp 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
pop 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 
fin_balance 4.89E-05*  2.83E-05*  4.12E-05*  
bp_balance 4.34E-05* 4.83E-05* 2.74E-05* 3.70E-05* 3.18E-05* 3.44E-05* 
fdi -1.43E-07   -1.52E-06   -1.29E-07   
net_interest -4.76E-05*  -4.46E-05*  -4.28E-05** 
fin_liabilities   -2.70E-06**  -1.86E-06   -2.15E-06* 
consump 0.0001* 4.04E-05* 5.25E-05* 0.0001* 4.80E-05* 7.30E-05* 9.90E-05* 3.27E-05** 4.05E-05* 
Constant -0.002* -0.0008* -0.001* -0.002* -0.0007* -0.001* -0.002* -0.0006** -0.0008* 
Obs. 511 592 587 496 563 562 506 581 580 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on OECD-CRS data. 
Notes: Fixed effects estimation with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) robust standard error. * p<0.05, ** p<0.1 
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The increase in GPG-related ODA has been accompanied by a process of goods’ selection by 
donors, who thus express their changes in priorities, as remarked also by te Velde et al. (2002). In 
particular in the last decade, some GPGs with weakest-link technologies, notably Crime 
control/peace building and Communicable disease control, have received larger shares of financing 
through aid flows. This could be explained by the rich countries’ fear of an insufficient provision by 
poor countries, which, increasingly, cannot afford to pay for them. Rich countries are therefore 
stepping in to avoid sub-optimal levels of provision, as foreseen by Sandler (1998). Further research 
could be conducted on these aspects, trying to include, the role of spatial correlation as an 
additional explanatory variable, endogenously deriving homogeneous groups of donors. 
The econometric part of the paper has been conducted to estimate whether GPGs financing crowd-
out other aid spending, as claimed by te Velde (2002) and Reisen et al. (2004). The analysis 
confirms the presence of a weak, but statistically significant crowding-out effect for  the broader 
definitions of GPGs (gpge and gpgr). The crowing-out is not uniform among donor countries and 
along the period analyzed. In fact, it is larger for North European and Anglo-Saxon countries and 
smoothly increasing in time. Differences in the crowding out effect could be explained by future 
item-specific research on donor’s expenditures and on the composition of the GPG bundles.  
The presence of a displacement effect between GPGs and other aid spending, should suggest to 
separate national accounting and budgeting systems for GPG and development financing, so to 
guarantee that funding for GPGs be a complement and not a substitute to development aid. As 
suggested for the first time in Raffer (1999), the OECD statistics should also track expenditure on 
GPGs by introducing a line item for them, including contributions that are not accounted as ODA. 
These statistics should also include a larger number of countries than the traditional DAC donors, as 
contributions to GPGs are increasingly coming from the major developing economies. Finally, the 
international goals should be separated: the famous UN 0.7 % target should be applied only to 
expenditures related to the promotion of human welfare and the reduction of poverty, while another 
target should be set for GPGs (Severino and Ray, 2009). 
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The econometric analysis has also tried to detect potential determinants of the donors’ choice of 
GPGs financing. In a panel data analysis, we observe the relevant role played by public finance 
constraints, openness to the rest of the world and donor’s size. Preference for domestic expenditure, 
as expressed by aggregate general government final consumption, is also a significant determinant. 
The single items of public domestic expenditure (defense, R&D, education, health) seem to 
influence GPG-related ODA according to their being more or less sensitive to global events. In the 
2000s, this sensitivity largely increases for defense and health expenditures, whose financing at the 
domestic level seems alternative to financing at the global level. 
Two caveats must be made before concluding. First, GPGs are not the sole responsible for the 
change in the patterns of aid that have been experienced since the 1990s. Other factors have played 
a relevant role as well: the identity crisis experienced by official development assistance after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall (Severino and Ray, 2009), changes in donors’ ideologies (Hjertholm and 
White, 2000) and in the development paradigm, the acknowledgment of the limits in aid 
effectiveness, the combination of evolving strategic and trade interests, geo-political considerations 
and political alliances. A second caveat concerns a fundament limit of this research: the picture of 
GPGs financing would need to be completed with the consideration of flows from non-DAC 
countries (China and Russia) and of explicit, non-ODA financing through the national budgets, 
which complement and/or substitute for the share of GPGs that are funded through the ODA 
channels. 
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